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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] Corporate America’s increasing dependence on the electronic use of
personally identifiable information (“PII”)1 necessitates a reexamination
and expansion of the traditional conception of corporate assets. PII is now
a commodity that companies trade and sell.2 As technological
∗
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1
The precise definition of personally identifiable information varies depending upon
context. “Personal information” typically encompasses a wide variety of identifiable
traits: first and last name, past and present addresses, e-mail addresses, telephone
numbers, social security number, gender, birth date, household income, financial and
credit account data, medical information, and purchasing history. See Will Thomas
DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283, 298
(2003).
2
See Corey Ciocchetti, The Privacy Matrix, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 245, 247
(2007)[hereinafter Ciocchetti, The Privacy Matrix]; Mark F. Kightlinger, The Gathering
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development increases, aspects of day-to-day business involving PII are
performed electronically in a more cost effective and efficient manner.3
PII, which companies obtain at little cost, has quantifiable value that is
rapidly reaching a level comparable to the value of traditional financial
assets.4
[2] There is a catch, however: companies benefiting from the value of PII
bear the burden of protecting the privacy interests attached to PII.5 In light
of technological advancement, which often threatens the security of
sensitive information,6 privacy ranks among the most important issues
facing modern society.7 And for good reason, the consumer privacy
interest in PII is in a precarious state. Absent adequate safeguards, the
building blocks of an individual’s virtual identity become increasingly
more vulnerable each time the information changes hands.8 This reality is
not lost on American consumers, who are becoming more aware of
privacy threats and more skeptical of current levels of privacy safety.9

Twilight? Information Privacy on the Internet in the Post-Enlightenment Era, 24 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 353, 384 (2006).
3
See Jessica M. Lewis, HIPAA: Demystifying the Implications for Financial Institutions,
8 N.C. BANKING INST. 141, 141 (2004).
4
See DeVries, supra note 1 at 298. (“[I]nstitutions have gradually realized that they sit
atop a horde of digital gold: their customers’ personal information.”). Id.
5
It is important to draw the distinction between privacy and PII from the outset. This
article suggests that PII has demonstrable value. Individuals and companies can, among
other things, trade, sell, combine and analyze PII. The individual to whom the PII
pertains has a privacy interest in the information, specifically the right to control access
to their information. The value of privacy is difficult to ascertain.
6
See Janice A. Alwin, Privacy Planning: Putting the Privacy Statutes To Work for You,
14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 353, 353 (2002); Haeji Hong, Dismantling the Private Enforcement
of the Privacy Act of 1974: Doe v. Chao, 38 AKRON L. REV. 71, 71 (2005).
7
Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: A Pragmatic Look at the Costs of
Privacy and the Benefits of Information Exchange, 2000 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, ¶ 1
(citing CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 221 (1999)).
8
See Edmund Mierzwinski, Privacy Information Sharing and the Boundaries of Each, B1473 PLI/CORP. 57, 83 (2005).
9
Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal but Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal
Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 428-29 & n.260.
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[3] While corporate executives are beginning to realize the importance of
data security,10 the steady rise of data breaches11 suggests that the groups
making internal policy decisions for many of America’s companies have
yet to grasp or accept a fundamental reality of the modern business
world.12 In order to continue benefiting from the ever-increasing value of
PII as an asset, corporate America’s leaders must recognize and protect the
value of their customers’ PII privacy interests in a manner similar to the
way they treat and protect financial assets.13 If companies fail to protect
this valuable interest, the backlash from disgruntled consumers and their
elected representatives will threaten the access to and use of PII.
[4] Part II of this article explains the basics of privacy, including the
definition of informational privacy and the impact of technology. Part III
reviews the value of PII to American companies. Part VI assesses the
magnitude of the threat to PII, as well as common sources that threaten PII
security. Part V covers the most important federal and state privacy
regulations in the United States. Part VI analyzes the causes and effects of
consumer discontent. Part VII broadly discusses the effects of PII
breaches and resulting litigation. Finally, Part VIII makes the case that
directors and executives must acknowledge that protection of the privacy
interest in PII is now a part of business that must be taken seriously.

10

Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Extending Learned Hand’s Negligence
Formula to Information Security Breaches, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 237, 238
(2007) (referencing survey of crisis management concerns of corporate executives).
11
Thomas Claburn, Record Number of Data Breaches Reported in 2007, INFO.WEEK,
Dec. 31, 2007,
http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=205206089
(last visited Mar. 31, 2009) [hereinafter Claburn, Record Number of Data Breaches]
(reviewing the increase in data breaches from 2006 to 2007).
12
This contention is by no means novel. Commentaries on this general problem, in
varying contexts, can be found in the academic literature. See generally Mark F. Foley,
Board Oversight of Information Technology, Data Privacy, and Data Security:
Preserving Critical Business Assets, 80 WIS. LAW. 17, 17 (2007) (offering an expanded
analysis of the problem in the specific context of electronic PII).
13
Jeffrey Taft, Privacy and Data Security in Service Provider Arrangements: Recent
Developments, 935 PLI/PAT. 485, 491 (2008).
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II. PRIVACY BASICS
[5] To understand the imperative of corporate America to provide for the
adequate protection of the privacy interest individuals have in their PII, it
is necessary to briefly review the traditional views of privacy and the
effect of technology in expanding these views. The evolution of the
privacy concept places corporate America in a new and unique position as
the steward of consumers’ virtual identities.
A. A HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF PRIVACY
[6] While privacy has many faces, the general concept of privacy has
existed throughout civilization in diverse cultures.14 In the American legal
community, the right to privacy first found expression as the right against
intrusion.15 While earlier sources express this concept of privacy in
varying contexts, the “right to be let alone” entered the American
jurisprudential lexicon through the seminal work of Samuel Warren and
Justice Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy.16 Although their article
14

Early expressions of the right to privacy are identifiable in Sumerian, Babylonian,
Judeo-Christian, and Indian writings. See, e.g., Janet Dean Gertz, Comment, The
Purloined Personality: Consumer Profiling in Financial Services, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
943, 968 (2002) (discussing aspects of privacy in Mosaic law); see also Michael D.
Roundy, Note, The Wiretap Act—Reconcilable Differences: A Framework for
Determining the “Interception” of Electronic Communications Following United States
v. Councilman’s Rejection of the Storage/Transit Dichotomy, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
403, 405 (2006) (discussing privacy aspects in the Code of Hammurabi).
15
One of the earliest expressions of the right to privacy in American jurisprudence was
echoed in Wheaton v. Peters, in which the United States Supreme Court stated
“defendant asks nothing—wants nothing, but to be let alone until it can be shown that he
has violated the rights of another.” Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 634 (1834). Another
early expression of the “right to be let alone” is found in T.M. Cooley’s work. THOMAS
COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 389 (rev. students’ ed. 1930) (“The new right
was conceived of as a right to be let alone—to be free from intrusions into one’s own
private affairs and from unauthorized publicity concerning one’s personal and private
affairs.”)
16
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193 (1890):
Gradually the scope of these legal rights broadened; and now the right
to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life, -- the right to be let
alone; the right to liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil
privileges; and the term ‘property’ has grown to comprise every form
of possession -- intangible, as well as tangible.
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examined privacy through the lens of tort theory, Brandeis later extended
the concept into the constitutional sphere in his dissent in Olmstead v.
United States.17 Unlike numerous state constitutions, the United States
Constitution does not contain an explicit reference to privacy.18 It is not
surprising, therefore, that the recognition of privacy as a constitutional
right by a United States Supreme Court majority opinion did not appear
until the mid-1960s.19 In Griswold v. Connecticut,20 the Court found that
the penumbras of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights create zones of
privacy.21 While the methodology of the Court in Griswold has been
subject to intense criticism,22 the conclusion that the Constitution protects
the right to privacy was groundbreaking and established a basis for
extending the right in other contexts.23 Our traditional view of privacy is
premised on the autonomy of the individual and the idea that people
should be free from intrusions into their personal lives.
B. RECONCILING PRIVACY WITH TECHNOLOGY
[7] Three major technological developments are transforming our view of
privacy: (1) the increase in data creation archiving vast amounts of
Id. at 193 (emphasis added).
17
277 U.S. 438 (1928). In his dissent in Olmstead, Justice Brandeis asserted that the
founding fathers “conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” Id. at 478
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Interestingly, a majority of the Supreme
Court of Georgia recognized the right to privacy under the Georgia Constitution ten years
before Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins.
Co., 122 Ga. 190, 197 50 S.E. 68, 71 (Ga. 1905).
18
For example, Florida’s Constitution states, “[e]very natural person has the right to be
let alone and free from governmental intrusion into [his] private life except as otherwise
provided herein.” E.g. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
19
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 515-16 (1965) (holding that a state statute
forbidding the use of contraceptives in the marital context violates the right of marital
privacy); see also Hong, supra note 6, at 76 (stating the Court has upheld the right of
privacy as a constitutionally protected right in several cases).
20
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21
See id. at 484.
22
Interestingly, Justice Hugo Black, perhaps the most influential civil libertarian to sit on
the Court, adamantly disagreed with the view that the Constitution protects privacy. See
ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 556-59 (2d ed. 1997).
23
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (extending the right to privacy in the
abortion context).
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personal data; (2) the globalization of data collection and examination; and
(3) the lack of adequate control mechanisms for digital information.24 Due
to these developments, the privacy discourse has largely shifted its focus
to the right to “informational privacy.”25 Informational privacy is the
“claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated
to others.”26
[8] Informational privacy does not fully equate to the traditional precept
of the “right to be let alone.”27 Informational privacy is broader, and more
complex, because it reaches beyond the immediate person and into the
stream of virtual commerce. Thus, the concept of the “self” in the privacy
context is gaining a new and exceedingly more complex meaning.28 The
privacy discourse must now account for cyber or virtual personhood and
the new privacy interests this manifestation creates.29 It is this virtual
personality, often voluntarily introduced into virtual commerce by a real
person, that individuals now seek to protect from intrusion.30
[9] The idea of virtual personality adds a significant third player to
privacy security: the data collector and holder.31 Companies are in the
best, and often times only, position to protect PII and the privacy interest

24

DeVries, supra note 1, at 291.
Judith DeCew, Privacy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Sept. 18, 2006,
http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/privacy/#InfPri (last visted Mar. 31, 2009); DeVries,
supra note 1, at 288-91.
26
Walker, supra note 7, ¶ 6 (quoting ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7
(1967)).
27
Walker, supra note 7, ¶ 5. In fact, “[j]urisprudence has drawn a ‘firm line’ between
‘substantive’ ideas of privacy relating to issues affecting personhood and informational
ones . . . .” Jonathon W. Penney, Privacy and the New Virtualism, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH.
194, 240 (2007) (quoting Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 297, 308 (2004)).
28
See COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY
INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 22 (2003) (discussing the virtual self in the
context of Foucalt’s notion of panopticon)
29
See generally Penney, supra note 27, at 216-29 (discussing personhood in cyberspace).
30
See id. at 225-28.
31
See Walker, supra note 7, ¶ 40.
25
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of the individual to whom the information belongs. 32 Because of this
unique position, and the extremely difficult task of identifying and
capturing identity thieves,33 companies that deal in PII are becoming
increasingly more responsible for the protection of PII.34 Liability for
failing to protect PII from data thieves is a real and present danger for
these companies; liability which will increase steadily with the growth of
the threat.
III. THE VALUE AND NECESSITY OF ELECTRONIC PII FOR CORPORATE
AMERICA
A. NECESSITY
[10] For many companies, the use of paper records has become
obsolete.35 As technology has advanced, corporate America has become
dependent upon the electronic storage, transmission, and management of
PII.36 Electronic management of PII is simply faster, cheaper, and easier.
The difference in cost between paper and electronic insurance claim
processing illustrates the enormous savings the electronic alternative
32

Joshua R. Levenson, Note, Strength in Numbers: An Examination into the Liability of
Corporate Entities for Consumer and Employee Data Breaches, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 95, 96 (2008).
33
The chances of a criminal being caught by federal enforces is one in 700. Chris Jay
Hoofnagle, Identity Theft: Making the Known Unknowns Known, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
97, 107-08 (2007) (citing AVIVAH LITAN, GARTNER, INC., UNDERREPORTING OF IDENTITY
THEFT REWARDS THE THIEVES 1 (2003),
http:www.gartner.com/gartner/images/116066.pdf). Obviously, if the resources of the
federal government are incapable of successfully tracking down identity thieves, the
chances of success for a private plaintiff are exceedingly small.
34
It is important to point out that a company’s duty to protect is not limited to guarding
against hackers or stolen laptops. As evidenced by the FTC’s treatment of ChoicePoint,
discussed infra Part VI.B.1, companies are responsible for assuring that the entities with
which they do business are legitimate.
35
See Foley, supra note 12, at 17-18 (discussing business transitions with reference to
technology).
36
See Yves Allain, The New European Directives on Public Procurement: Change or
Continuity?, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 517, 522 (2006); Thomas J. Manley & Scott M. Hobby,
Globalization of Work: Offshore Outsourcing in the IT Age, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
401, 402 (2004); The Sedona Conference, Best Practices Commentary on the Use of
Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 192
(2007) [hereinafter The Sedona Conference’s Best Practices Commentary].
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provides.37 As one commentator points out, the cost of processing an
electronic claim is $0.25 to $0.75—a fraction of the $2 to $12 cost of
processing the same claim using paper.38 Managing PII electronically also
provides companies with a cost effective outsourcing option, which would
be inconceivable if paper were the primary mode of data transfer.39
[11] Companies save substantial cost, time, and resources by using
electronic data storage instead of physical storage.40 In the past,
companies filed information in bankers’ boxes, and then stored the boxes
in a warehouse, which might not have been close to a company’s office.41
Today, companies are able to keep the same information in the company’s
office by storing it electronically on hard drives or other data storage
devices.42 Information that once may have taken days to locate is now
available instantaneously.43 Electronic data storage has also cut the costs
of physical transportation and rental space.44 In addition to these savings,
the cost of electronic storage continues to plummet.45
B. THE VALUE OF PII
[12] PII is an exceptional resource that companies can use for internal
marketing purposes or to sell to other companies.46 For example, the data
points identifying an individual’s name and gender would be of little value
to the marketing director of a Big & Tall store. But combining that
information with weight and height data points would be very valuable to
the same marketing director. When a company can identify consumers in
its target demographic, its marketing department can efficiently direct
advertising resources to that demographic by excluding consumers that
37

See Lewis, supra note 3, at 141.
Id.
39
See Manley & Hobby, supra note 36, at 402.
40
See The Sedona Conference’s Best Practices Commentary, supra note 36, at 192.
41
See id.
42
Id.
43
See Manley & Hobby, supra note 36, at 402.
44
See The Sedona Conference’s Best Practices Commentary, supra note 36, at 192.
45
James X. Dempsey, Digital Search & Seizure: Updating Privacy Protections to Keep
Pace with Technology, 935 PLI/PAT. 543, 548 (2008). From 1990 to 2007, the storage
cost for a typical gigabyte fell from $20,000 to less than $1. The Sedona Conference’s
Best Practices Commentary, supra note 33, at 192.
46
See Ciocchetti, The Privacy Matrix, supra note 2, at 253.
38
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would likely have no interest in the company’s product.47 Here, the
benefit to a company using PII is twofold: it raises the probability that
advertising will translate into sales, and it cuts the expense of advertising
to uninterested consumers.48
[13] Another legitimate use of PII enables companies to attract new
customers and retain existing customers by offering them the benefits of
personalized advertising.49 And maintaining consumers’ personal
information “can help both companies and consumers, allowing for more
tailored customer service without requiring customers to provide the same
information repeatedly.”50 Thus, consumers also benefit from the
transparent collection of their personal information.51
[14] Due, in part, to the use of PII in marketing decisions, commentators
are conceptualizing PII as a commodity.52 Individual data points have
concrete value,53 which can be traded on what is becoming a burgeoning
47

Corey Ciocchetti, Just Click Submit: The Collection, Dissemination, and Tagging of
Personally Identifying Information, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 553, 578-79 (2008)
[hereinafter Ciocchett, Just Click Submit].
48
See Tal Z. Zarsky, Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using Implementation-Based
Solutions for the Troubles of Information Privacy in the Age of Data Mining and the
Internet Society, 56 ME. L. REV. 13, 37 (2004).
49
See Ciocchetti, Just Click Submit, supra note 47, at 578-79. (alerting consumers when
their favorite product on sale).
50
Gregory T. Parks & Megan E. Adams, Can Your Firm Be Sued for a Data Breach?, ECOMMERCE TIMES, Dec. 8, 2006,
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/6zyeqfIOat4KEK/Can-Your-Firm-Be-Sued-fora-Data-Breach.xhtml (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
51
See Zarsky, supra note 48, at 36-37.
52
See Horace E. Anderson, The Privacy Gambit: Toward a Game Theoretic Approach to
International Data Protection, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 5 (2006); Grayson Barber,
Personal Information in Government Records: Protecting the Public Interest in Privacy,
25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 63, 96 (2006); Ciocchetti, The Privacy Matrix, supra note 2,
at 247; Mark F. Kightlinger, Twilight of the Idols? EU Internet Privacy and the Post
Enlightenment Paradigm, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 39 (2007); Viktor Mayer-Schonberger,
Beyond Copyright: Managing Information Rights with DRM, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 181,
195 (2006).
53
In 2006, one commentator stated that “a consumer’s address can be purchased for 50
cents, an unpublished number for $17.50, a Social Security number for a mere $8, and so
on.” Luis Salazar, Part I: Technology Explosion Creates Personal Privacy Tensions, 25
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18, 18 (2006). Commenting on the value of information, one
commentator has noted, “Even in the manufacturing sectors, the processing of
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market for PII.54 The value of the data increases when combined to
provide information, such as consumer preferences that are not discernable
from the data points individually.55 As a result, companies are
maintaining, sharing, and selling dossiers of millions of consumer
preferences.56 And as marketing departments become more cognizant of
the value of processed information that reveals consumer preferences, the
value of this information, along with the PII market, will continue to grow.
[15] PII, if used properly, can generate legitimate profits that require very
little input. Further, the ability to maintain PII eliminates the necessity of
purchasing PII from another source. But the freedom with which
companies currently use PII, and the benefits deriving from such use, is
contingent upon the continued acquiescence of consumers and their
elected representatives. The potential for increased profits and cost
savings serve as a substantial impetus for companies to ensure their
actions do not compromise access to this valuable resource.
VI. THE THREAT TO PII
A. THE INCIDENCE OF LARGE SCALE DATA BREACH
[16] The incidence of large data breach is growing at a staggering pace.
In 2005, 130 data breaches were reported.57 This number rose to 315 in
2006, and again to 443 in 2007—an increase of over forty percent in one
year.58 Since 2005, data breaches have compromised over 216 million
information about the goods sold, and about those who purchase and use them, is as
important as the production and shipping of the goods themselves.” Anderson, supra
note 52, at 4.
54
The market for personal information is $1.5 billion annually. Christopher F. Carlton,
The Right to Privacy in Internet Commerce: A Call for New Federal Guidelines and the
Creation of an Independent Privacy Commission, 16 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
393, 405 (2002); Kightlinger, supra note 52, at 39.
55
See Zarsky, supra note 48, at 37.
56
Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 970 (2003).
57
Derek A. Bishop, To Serve and Protect: Do Businesses Have a Legal Duty to Protect
Collections of Personal Information?, 3 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 7 (2006) (citing Jon
Swartz, 2005 Worst Year for Breaches of Computer Security, USA TODAY, Dec. 29,
2005, at 1B).
58
Claburn, Record Number of Data Breaches, supra note 11.
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customer records.59 In a recent survey of more than 800 privacy
professionals, eighty-five percent acknowledged at least one data breach
occurred at their company in the past year.60 Of those same professionals,
sixty-three percent acknowledged multiple data breaches over the same
period.61 The statistics for data breaches that translate into actual identity
fraud is also a significant concern. From 2005 to 2006, approximately
fifteen million Americans fell victim to identity fraud.62 Perhaps of equal
importance, the number of fraud cases during this period rose over fifty
percent from the number of cases in 2003.63
[17] In the past three years, entities that have suffered a data breach vary
from universities to financial institutions. From January 2005 through
September 2008, no fewer than 200 American universities, representing
every region of the country, experienced a data breach.64 Financial
institutions have also been a common target. Financial giants, including
CitiFinancial, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and Wachovia, have all
experienced a substantial data breach.65 Other recognizable companies
representing an array of industries that have experienced a data breach
include Boeing, MCI, Kaiser Permanente, Kraft Foods, MTV Networks,
Advance Auto Parts, Harley Davidson, Inc., AT&T, and Lloyds of
London, just to name a few.66 Additionally, government entities on the

59

Thomas Claburn, The Cost of Data Loss Rises, INFORMATIONWEEK, Nov. 28, 2007,
http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=204204152
(last visited Mar. 31, 2009) [hereinafter Claburn, The Cost of Data Loss Rises].
60
Reportable and Multiple Privacy Breaches Rising at Alarming Rate, According to
Deloitte, Ponemon Institute Survey, PRNEWSWIRE, Dec. 11, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS233283+11-Dec-2007+PRN20071211
(last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
61
Id.
62
Erin Fonté, Who Should Pay the Price for Identity Theft?, 54 FED. LAW. 24, 25 (2007).
63
Id.
64
The universities targeted represent every geographic region; from the University of
Florida to the University of Alaska; from the University of San Diego to Harvard
University; and all points in between. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse: A Chronology of
Data Breaches, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm#CP (last visited
Mar. 30, 2009).
65
Id.; see Kathryn E. Picanso, Protecting Information Security Under a Uniform Data
Breach Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 356 (2006).
66
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 64.
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federal,67 state,68 and local69 levels have experienced a data breach. These
incidents indicate that data breach can occur in any size company, in any
region, and in any industry. Failing to protect PII, therefore, is not far
removed from financial Russian roulette.
B. SOURCES AND SCOPE OF DATA BREACH
[18] Data breach results from a plethora of sources.70 The loss of laptops
and similar devices is the most common source of data breach, accounting
for forty-nine percent of data breaches.71 Each laptop lost accounts for an
extraordinarily large number of compromised files.72 Between 2005 and
2006, thirty-two million compromised files were attributable to
approximately seventy stolen laptops.73 In May 2006, the theft of a laptop
and a computer storage device compromised data on 28.6 million
veterans.74 This trend continued through 2007 and 2008. In September
2007, the loss of a laptop at Gap, Inc. compromised the personal
information of 800,000 job applicants.75 Some months later, in March
2008, the loss of a box of computer tapes at Bank of New York Mellon
compromised the personal information of approximately 12.5 million
customers.76 As with data breach in general, breach due to loss of laptops
and other equipment is not specific to any particular industry.77 Incidents

67

The Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Defense, the Department of
Transportation, and the Department of Veterans Affairs suffered breaches. Id.
68
Georgia, Massachusetts, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Rhode Island all experienced
a breach at some level. Id.
69
School Districts in Beaverton, Oregon and San Diego, California, and the Detroit
Water and Sewage Department were also breached. Id.
70
Liisa M. Thomas, The Emerging Law of Data Security: From Corporate Obligations to
Provide Security to Breach Notification Requirements, 934 PLI/PAT. 357, 368 (2008).
71
PONEMON INSTITUTE, LLC, 2007 ANNUAL STUDY: U.S. COST OF A DATA BREACH 11
fig.3 (2007) [hereinafter PONEMON INSTITUTE, LLC, 2007 ANNUAL STUDY].
72
Chad Pinson, New Legal Frontier: Mass Information Loss and Security Breach, 11
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 27, 28 (2007).
73
Id.
74
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 64.
75
Id.
76
This estimate was reached in August 2008, a significant increase from the original
estimate of 4.5 million. Id.
77
Id.
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have occurred in the financial78 and healthcare sectors,79 at universities,80
and at various levels of government.81
[19] Third parties or outsourcers, malicious insiders, hacked systems, and
malicious codes also create a large number of data breaches.82 While
these incidents are less common than breach due to lost laptops, the
aggregate number of records compromised is extremely high.83 Hackers
are particularly troublesome because they can compromise information
without detection84 and are extremely difficult to catch.85 The scope of
data loss that results when a system is breached can be astronomical. To
date, the most infamous data breach occurred at TJX Companies, Inc.,
where hackers compromised ninety-four million credit card and debit card
accounts.86 Other major data breaches caused by hackers have occurred at
CardSystems Solutions, Inc. (forty million credit card records were
compromised),87 Monster.com (1.6 million resumes were compromised),88

78

Incidents have occurred at CitiFinancial, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Bank of America, just
to name a few of the larger players. Id.
79
Incidents have occurred at Aetna and Kaiser Permanente. Id.
80
Among others, incidents have occurred at George Mason University, Montclair State
University, and Cornell University. Id.
81
Id., supra notes 67-69.
82
See PONEMON INSTITUTE, LLP, 2007 ANNUAL STUDY, supra note 71, at 11 fig.3.
(illustrating the allocation of the causes of data breach: laptops lost or stolen (49%); third
party or outsourcers (16%); malicious insiders (9%); paper records (9%); electronic
backup (7%); hacked systems (5%); malicious codes, like malware and spyware (4%);
and other (2%)).
83
Id.
84
See G. Martin Bingisser, Data Privacy and Breach Reporting: Compliance with
Various State Laws, 4 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 9, ¶ 24 (2008).
85
Hoofnagle, supra note 33, at 107-08.
86
Martin H. Bosworth, TJX To Pay Mastercard $24 Million for Data Breach,
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Apr. 6, 2008,
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2008/04/tjx_mc.html (last visited Mar. 31,
2009); Jon Swartz, TJX Data Breach May Involve 94 Million Credit Cards, USA
TODAY.COM, Oct. 24, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/computersecurity/infotheft/2007-10-24-tjx-securitybreach_N.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2009). See generally Richard A. Epstein & Thomas
P. Brown, Cybersecurity in the Payment Card Industry, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (2008)
(providing an expansive analysis of the TJX debacle).
87
Jonathan Krim & Michael Barbaro, 40 Million Credit Card Numbers Hacked, WASH.
POST, June 18, 2005, at A1.

13

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XV, Issue 4

and TD Ameritrade Holding Corp (contact information for 6.3 million
individuals was compromised).89
[20] Similarly, malicious insiders can account for massive amounts of
compromised data. In 2007, a malicious insider at Fidelity National
Information Systems stole 8.5 million customer records.90 In 2008, a
similar event at Countrywide Financial Corp. resulted in two million
compromised files.91
C. ASSESSING THE PROBLEM
[21] Data breach clearly presents a growing threat for U.S. companies,
both in incidence and scope. Perhaps fortunately, however, many of the
threats to data security are organic and may be curtailed through strict
enforcement of internal data protection policies.92 In addition, solutions
including encryption, spyware and virus detection, and access protocols
leverage technology to prevent breach.93 As corporate America becomes
more dependent upon the electronic use of PII, and as the liability costs of
failing to protect that information rise, the internal decision makers must
accept the reality that PII management and protection demands a greater
allocation of company resources.

88

Job Seekers Compromised by Monster.com Hack, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Aug. 22,
2007, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2007/08/monster_hack.html (last visited
Mar. 31, 2009).
89
Martin H. Bosworth, Hackers Steal Information on 6.3 Million Ameritrade Customers,
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Sept. 15, 2007,
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2007/09/ameritrade_hack.html, (last visited
Mar. 31, 2009).
90
Jaikumar Vijayan, Fidelity National Data Theft Affects 8.5 Million Customers,
PCWORLD, July 27, 2007,
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/135117/fidelity_national_data_theft_
ffects_85_million_ customers.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
91
Renae Merle, Countrywide Says Consumer Data Were Sold, WASH. POST, Sept. 14,
2008, at F5.
92
See PONEMON INSTITUTE, LLP, 2007 ANNUAL STUDY, supra note 71, at 11.
93
See Thomas M. Laudise, Ten Practical Things To Know About “Sensitive” Data
Collection and Protection, 929 PLI/PAT. 389, 405 (2008).
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V. PRIVACY LEGISLATION: THE PUZZLE OF FEDERAL AND STATE SPHERES
OF COVERAGE
[22] Currently, privacy regulation in the United States is best described as
a haphazard set of industry specific regulations, at both the federal and
state level, which frequently overlap and are often contradictory.94
Congress has approached privacy regulation with sectoral legislation95
introducing “specific remedies to specific problems.”96 Where gaps exist
in this sectoral approach, Congress has delegated authority to the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) “to enforce privacy policy promises under its
general unfair and deceptive practice powers.”97 In contrast, state
legislation offers a broad approach to PII regulation, the most significant
of which are data breach notification laws.98 Despite the patchwork nature
of current privacy legislation, it is clear that “[t]he trend in the law is
toward imposition of more stringent and more detailed baseline
requirements for achieving and demonstrating adequate information
security for protected information.”99 This trend will translate into
potentially debilitating costs for companies that fail to keep up with the
required level of information security.

94

Walker, supra note 7, ¶ 118.
Corey A. Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information Privacy: Privacy Policies as
Personal Information Protectors, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 55, 73 (2007) [hereinafter Ciocchetti,
E-Commerce and Information Privacy]
96
Id. The U.S. approach contrasts sharply with the approach taken by some of our
closest trade partners. For example, the European Union’s regulatory approach provides
broad statements of privacy “principles to which society must adhere.” Id. Additionally,
U.S. federal and state “statutes have generally been narrow in scope compared to the
more ‘horizontal’ privacy legislation enacted in Canada.” Mark S. Hayes, The Impact of
Privacy on Intellectual Property in Canada, 20 Intell. Prop. J. 67, 69 n.3 (2006).
97
Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information Privacy, supra note 95, at 73.
98
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65 (2008).
99
John B. Kennedy, A Primer on Key Information Security Laws in the United States,
934 PLI/PAT. 117, 126 (2008).
95
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A. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SECTORAL APPROACH
[23] Congress’ sectoral approach100 generally targets four key areas.101
Three of these areas, concern regulation of private entities, while the
fourth concerns regulation of governmental entities.102 First, the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (“COPPA”) covers
children under the age of thirteen.103 Second, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) applies to health
care institutions and providers.104 Third, the Financial Services
Moderation Act, known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
(“GLBA”) regulates financial institutions.105
1. COPPA
[24] COPPA is an expansive piece of legislation. The purpose of COPPA
is to prevent unfair and deceptive practices concerning children’s PII by
prohibiting the unauthorized collection of PII from children under the age
of thirteen.106 Congress enacted COPPA:
(1) to enhance parental involvement in a child’s online
activities in order to protect the privacy of children in the
100

Commentators note that “U.S. privacy laws to date exist in targeted industries, such as
the financial and medical and health industries.” Taft, supra note 13, at 492.
101
Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information Privacy, supra note 95, at 73-74.
102
The focus here is on the federal statutory approach to privacy protection as it relates to
non-governmental entities. There are other statutory mechanisms enacted for the purpose
of protecting privacy that are applicable to governmental entities. See, e.g., Privacy Act
of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000) (protecting federal records that contain PII and creating
restrictions and requirements for federal agencies with regard to information disclosure);
see also Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000) (prohibiting the
disclosure and use of State motor vehicle records); Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.); E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107347, 116 Stat. 2899 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 13, 15, 18, 28, 31,
40, 41, and 44 U.S.C.) (requiring government agencies to publish Privacy Impact
Assessments).
103
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2006).
104
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
105
Financial Modernization Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2006).
106
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998); see also 144 Cong. Rec. S12741-04
(1998).
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online environment; (2) to enhance parental involvement to
help protect the safety of children in online fora such as
chatrooms, home pages, and pen-pal services in which
children may make public postings of identifying
information; (3) to maintain the security of personally
identifiable information of children collected online; and
(4) to protect children’s privacy by limiting the collection
of personal information from children without parental
consent.107
2. HIPAA
[25] In 1996, Congress attempted to standardize privacy concerning
health care information with HIPAA.108 To foster efficiency, HIPAA
requires the standardization of electronic data interchange in healthcare
delivery.109 HIPPA also addresses the confidentiality and security of
health data by setting standards and the means of enforcing those
standards.110 The legislation requires the Department of Health and
Human Services to publish new rules that will ensure “[s]tandardization of
electronic patient health, administrative and financial data,” “[u]nique
health identifiers for individuals, employers, health plans and health care
providers,” and “[s]ecurity standards protecting the confidentiality and
integrity of ‘individually identifiable health information,’ past, present and
future.”111
3. GLBA
[26] As HIPAA protects health information, GLBA protects financial
information.112 GLBA imposes new requirements and rules on financial
107

Janine Hiller et al., Pocket Protection, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 417, 428 (2008) (citing 144
Cong. Rec. S12741-04 (1998) (remarks of Sen. Bryan)).
108
HIPAA, Whatis.com, http://searchcio.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid19_
gci862786,00.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
109
Vox2Data: Electronic Health Record and Voice Activated Transcription Software for
Physicians, http://www.vox2data.com/faqs.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
See Anthony Rollo, The New New Litigation Thing: Consumer Privacy, 1301
PLI/CORP. 9, 27 (2002).
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institutions, including: requirements to protect personal financial
information of customers, restrictions on disclosure to non-affiliate third
parties, requirements to disclose security and privacy policies to
consumers, and prohibitions of the use of fraudulent means to obtain
financial information.113 Importantly, GLBA contained new privacy
regulations to protect financial “nonpublic personal information.”114
B. DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS
[27] Following a general trend of information disclosure,115 commentators
and legislatures turned their attention to laws requiring companies to
disclose data security breaches shortly after the turn of the millennium.
The approach of data breach notification laws differs from the sectoral
approach in two principal respects. First, where the sectoral approach
provides comprehensive regulation, including preventative requirements,
data breach notification regulation concerns post-breach requirements.116
Second, data breach notification laws generally transcend the limited
approach of addressing individual sectors by focusing broadly on all
entities that store or maintain PII.117

113

GLBA extends beyond what would traditionally be considered a financial institution.
“Among the institutions that fall under FTC jurisdiction for purposes of the GLB Act are
non-bank mortgage lenders, loan brokers, some financial or investment advisers, tax
preparers, providers of real estate settlement services, and debt collectors.” Federal
Trade Commission, In Brief: The Financial Privacy Requirements of the Graham-LeachBliley Act, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/idtheft/bus53.pdf.
114
DeVries, supra note 1, at 299 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2006)).
115
See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches,
105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 916 (2007). Professors Schwartz and Janger provide the
following examples of other information disclosure requirements: mandates that hospitals
“publicize performance results for certain medical procedures,” mandates that
manufacturers affix energy efficiency labels to products, and mandates that companies
report workplace injuries. Id. at 915. Cass Sunstein coined the term “regulation through
disclosure” to describe this trend. Id. (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Information Regulation
and Information Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 613 (1999)).
116
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2006) (regulating financial institutions) with N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 75-65 (2008) (affecting any business that “owns or licenses personal
information”).
117
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65 (2008).
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[28] While numerous data breach notification bills have been
introduced,118 there is currently no broad-based federal data breach
notification legislation.119 Further, it is questionable if the bills now
before Congress will become law.120 As consumers become more
conscious of the precarious state of their privacy interests in their PII, and
companies become overwhelmed by the difficulties of complying with
numerous state laws, it is reasonable to assume that Congress will enact
federal legislation to bring consistency to the area of data breach
notification law.
[29] While a federal law is lacking, forty-four states, as well as the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, have enacted data breach
notification legislation.121 State data breach notification laws generally
require companies to inform customers when a data breach affecting
consumer information occurs.122 In most states, any entity that owns,
licenses, or maintains PII belonging to a citizen of that state falls under the

118

Brandon Faulkner, Note, Hacking into Data Breach Notification Laws, 59 FLA. L.
REV. 1097, 1114, 1114 nn.115 & 117 (2007) (citing numerous bills introduced during the
109th and 110th Congresses); see also Senate Vote on Data Brokers Likely This Week,
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Sept. 25, 2006,
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/senate_data_privacy.html (last visited
Mar. 31, 2009).
119
Kristan T. Cheng, Identity Theft and the Case for a National Credit Report Freeze
Law, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 239, 269-70 (2008); see James T. Graves, Note,
Minnesota’s PCI Law: A Small Step on the Path to a Statutory Duty of Data Security Due
Care, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1115, 1120 (2008). One commentator has opined that
the lack of a federal law reflects “growing concerns that most of the bills would take a
step backward from existing state laws.” Vinita Bali, Data Privacy, Data Piracy: Can
India Provide Adequate Protection for Electronically Transferred Data?, 21 TEMP. INT’L
& COMP. L.J. 103, 115 (2007).
120
Kennedy, supra note 99, at 209.
121
See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Security Breach Notification
Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/ programs/lis/cip/priv/breachlaws.htm (last visited Mar. 31,
2009). Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have data breach notification laws. Id.
122
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7501 (2009); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS §
445.72 (2007).
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statutory purview.123 State laws differ, to a degree, on the types of actions
triggering the duty to disclose. Some states require disclosure upon
breach, while other states require disclosure when, after internal
investigation, PII is believed to have been compromised.124 In addition,
most state laws do not require disclosure if it was encrypted data that was
lost.125
C. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA
[30] The cost of failing to comply with federal privacy regulation
warrants the attention of corporate America.126 HIPAA, for example,
provides for civil and criminal penalties.127 Failure to comply with
HIPAA’s requirements creates civil “penalties of $100 per violation, up to
$25,000 per year.”128 Criminal sanctions, however, are much more severe,
reaching up to $250,000 in fines and ten years in prison.129 While COPPA
does not carry criminal penalties,130 the FTC sent companies a clear
message that violations of COPPA will receive severe treatment.131 In
2006, the FTC pursued Xanga.com for COPPA violations; the controversy
ended in a settlement agreement that required Xanga.com to “pay a $1
million fine, implement policies compliant with COPPA, file additional

123

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716(2)(a)-(b) (2009); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §
75-65 (2008).
124
Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7501 (2009) (requiring notification after a
breach), with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-701b (2009) (not requiring notification after a
breach if a reasonable determination is made “that the breach will not likely result in
harm to the individuals whose personal information has been acquired and accessed”).
125
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §24-4.9-3-3 (2008).
126
Foley, supra note 12, at 18 (“Noncompliance with regulatory schemes may result in
orders prohibiting data use or other practices, civil or criminal fines, imprisonment for
managers and directors, or decades-long oversight by regulatory agencies.”).
127
American Medical Association, HIPAA Violations and Enforcement,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/11805.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2009)
(discussing HIPAA violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2006)).
128
Id.; see Lewis, supra note 3, at 141-42.
129
American Medical Association, supra note 119.
130
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2006).
131
See Hiller et al., supra note 107, at 418 (“The FTC fine against Xanga was the largest
ever imposed under COPPA.”)
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status reports, and submit to monitoring by the FTC.”132 These examples
are just the beginning. As the threat to PII grows, so will the breadth of
statutory coverage and consequences of failing to adhere to federal
mandates.
[31] The costs associated with state regulation may be even more
substantial.133 Depending upon the amount of information compromised,
the process of data breach notification can create substantial costs.134 A
2007 study estimates that notification of data breach costs $15 per
record.135 Providing notification for breaches similar in scale to those
sustained by TJX136 or CardSystems137 could result in costs that would
prove debilitating to many U.S. companies. The challenge of adhering to
the different notification requirements of different state statutes adds
significant strategic obstacles, and failure to provide adequate notification
can create additional costs. For example, under Florida’s data breach
notification statute, a company may be liable “[i]n the amount of $1,000
for each day the breach goes undisclosed for up to 30 days and, thereafter,
$50,000 for each 30-day period or portion thereof for up to 180 days.”138
Furthermore, companies that do not disclose within 180 days may be

132

Id. (citing Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Xanga.com To Pay $1 Million to
Violating Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (Sept. 7, 2006) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/09/xanga.shtm).
133
See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 99, at 185 (noting that “[i]n addition to state Attorney
Generals, other state agencies have sometimes been involved in the enforcement of their
state’s breach notification laws.”).
134
See Ellen Messmer, TJX Lists Mounting Costs of Data-Breach Debacle, NETWORK
W ORLD, June 8, 2007, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/060807-tjx.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2009) (“In its quarterly filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, TJX acknowledged that the computer intrusion . . . cost it $20 million
during the first quarter alone, and that costs were expected to continue to mount in future
quarters.”).
135
PONEMON INSTITUTE, LLC, 2007 ANNUAL STUDY, supra note 71, at 9.
136
See Bosworth, TJX To Pay Mastercard $24 Million for Data Breach, supra note 86;
Swartz, supra note 86.
137
See Krim & Barbaro, supra note 87.
138
FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(b)(1) (2008).
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subject to “an administrative fine of up to $500,000”139 and the cost of
failing to notify increases with each state statute that is implicated.140
[32] While the fines resulting from noncompliance with privacy
legislation, and the cost associated with providing data breach notification
are substantial, the prospect of tighter, more comprehensive regulation
may be even more daunting. Companies obviously have a significant
interest in crafting their own data protection protocols.141 But if the high
incidence of data breach continues, governmental bodies may find it
necessary to enact legislation that will impose broader and more
burdensome requirements for data protection. More concerning is the fact
that legislatures may create laws restricting the ability of companies to
access, store, use, and transfer electronic data.142 To prevent the
enactment of legislative measures of this type, companies must take it
upon themselves to reduce the incidence of data breach by proactively
creating internal measures that effectively provide for the protection of
PII.
VI. PRIVACY LAWSUITS
A. PRIVATE SUITS
[33] Some commentators argue that traditional tort doctrines adequately
protect against harms caused by loss or misuse of personal information.143
139

FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(b)(2) (2008).
See Kirk J. Nahra, New State Information-Security Requirements Challenge Business,
PRIVACY I N F OCUS, Nov. 2008, at 1,
http://www.wileyrein.com/docs/newsletter_issues/622.pdf.
141
See id., at 2, 4, 5.
142
See Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, Recent State Data Privacy Laws and Court
Decisions Impose Extensive Obligations on Companies that Collect and Process
Personal Information, Oct. 10, 2008,
http://www.willkie.com/files/tbl_s29Publications%5CFileUpload5686%5C2732%5CRec
ent_State_Data_Privacy_Laws.pdf (“Companies doing business in [] states must
carefully review these new requirements and develop and implement compliance
procedures to protect adequately the nonpublic personal information they collect, store,
and distribute.”).
143
See Walker, supra note 7, ¶ 171 (noting that “[c]onsumers can already sue a company
whose system was hacked” and that “private sector enforcement . . . is the real
enforcement mechanism for meaningful security”).
140
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Currently, however, the bridge between traditional tort and privacy law is
incomplete.144 Many potential lawsuits are never filed because the market
or judicial valuation of an individual’s PII is not sufficiently high to offset
the cost of litigation.145 Further, as damages are usually difficult to prove,
even a verdict for the plaintiff does not guarantee an award of damages.146
[34] But, certain political and legislative developments indicate that the
climate could soon change.147 Proposed theories for extending liability for
data breach to companies holding PII already exist in academic
literature.148 It is likely only a matter of time before courts begin to adopt
similar theories of liability and common law standards emerge.149
Companies will have to defend against lawsuits brought by individuals
harmed by data breach and financial institutions that incur costs due to
data breach.150 Minnesota has already enacted a statute that allows
financial institutions to pursue retailers and merchants for costs incurred
due to data breach,151 and similar legislation is pending in other states.152

144

See Paul M. Schwartz, Spyware: The Latest Cyber-Regulatory Challenge: Privacy and
Inalienability and the Regulation of Spyware, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1269, 1275
(2005)
145
See Walker, supra note 7, ¶¶ 168, 178; Schwartz, supra note 144, at 1275.
146
Schwartz, supra note 144, at 1275; Levenson, supra note 32, at 102.
147
See Parks & Adams, supra note 50 (“Congress and state legislatures have begun
considering new laws relating to data privacy and security.”).
148
See Jennifer A. Chandler, Negligence Liability for Breaches of Data Security, 23
BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 223, 225 (2008) (addressing “the possibility of using liability in
negligence as a means to deter unreasonably careless data security practices as well as to
offer compensation to those harmed by data security breaches.”); Meiring de Villiers,
Reasonable Foreseeability in Information Security Law: A Forensic Analysis, 30
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 419, 420 (2008) (presenting “an analysis of civil liability
for failure to safeguard confidential information.”); Levenson, supra note 32, at 97
(finding “a legal cause of action for a breach of contract against a corporation that
aggregates personally identifiable information”); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 10, at 237
(arguing “that Learned Hand’s famous risk/utility test should be extended to create a duty
to secure computer systems applicable against companies that hold sensitive personal
information”).
149
See, e.g., Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 541 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that California’s Financial Information Privacy Act was not preempted by the
Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act).
150
See Bosworth, TJX To Pay Mastercard $24 Million for Data Breach, supra note 86;
Swartz, supra note 86.
151
See Kennedy, supra note 99, at 186 (citing MINN. STAT. § 325E.64 (2008)).
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Once this occurs, the extension of liability will develop rapidly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
[35] As noted above, state laws that create a right of action for financial
institutions are emerging.153 The settlements between TJX and financial
institutions that incurred losses due to the TJX breach illustrate the
magnitude of the costs companies may incur by failing to protect PII.154
By mid-2008, TJX had spent tens of millions of dollars settling with
financial institutions, including a $24 million settlement with MasterCard
and its issuing lenders,155 and a larger $40.9 million settlement with
Visa.156 These settlements are likely to embolden financial institutions in
the future to take PII security seriously, thereby increasing the liability of
companies that fail to follow suit.
B. GOVERNMENT LAWSUITS
1. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT
[36] The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has the authority to fill in
the gaps left by Congress’s sectoral approach.157 Initially, the FTC
suggested that industry self-regulation offered the best defense of online

152

Id. at 186-87 (noting that similar legislation to Minnesota’s statute is also pending in
Texas, Illinois, Michigan, Washington, and Massachusetts).
153
See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text. As Attorney John Kennedy of Dewey
& LeBoeuf notes, “[t]hese statutes reverse court decisions that came in the wake of the
breach at BJ's Warehouse in which courts dismissed all claims against BJ's by banks that
had to replace payment cards following the theft of customer card data from BJ's.”
Kennedy, supra note 99, at 187.
154
See Bosworth, TJX To Pay Mastercard $24 Million for Data Breach, supra note 86;
Swartz, supra note 86.
155
Linda McGlasson, TJX, MasterCard Agree on $24 Million Settlement: Institutions
Have 90 Days to Approve Deal in Data Breach Case, BANK INFO S ECURITY, Apr. 4,
2008, http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/articles. php?art_id=811 (last visited Mar. 31,
2009); Bosworth, TJX To Pay Mastercard $24 Million for Data Breach, supra note 86.
156
Mark Jewell, TJX, Visa Reach $40.9M Settlement for Data Breach, USA TODAY,
Nov. 30, 2007, http:// www.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/2007-11-30-tjx-visabreach-settlement_N.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2009); see Mark Huffman, TJX Settles
Visa Suit Over Data Breach, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Nov. 30, 2007, http://www.
consumeraffairs.com/news04/2007/11/tjx_visa.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
157
See Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information Privacy, supra note 95, at 73.
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privacy.158 Not long after taking this position, however, the FTC
performed an about-face, recognizing that industry self-regulation had
fallen short of its goals.159 After reevaluating the necessity of its
involvement, the FTC asserted itself as a major player in the pursuit of
privacy violations.
[37] In 2000, the FTC trained its sights on the ad-serving company,
DoubleClick.160 Privacy alarms sounded when DoubleClick announced its
intention to acquire Abacus Corp., a business that used traditional direct
marketing and had a massive database of consumer PII.161 The pairing of
these two companies could have led to very extensive and detailed profiles
of Internet users.162 The FTC initiated its investigation based on a
complaint that DoubleClick had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade
practices by tracking online activities of Internet users and combining that
data with detailed PII contained in a separate national marketing
database.163 DoubleClick placed “cookies” in banner advertisements on
WebPages.164 Clicking on these banner ads would redirect the Internet
browser to a DoubleClick server.165 This permitted DoubleClick to create
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profiles about users and their Internet surfing habits.166 Concern over the
possibility of privacy intrusion led to multiple state and federal lawsuits.167
[38] In the end, the court consolidated these suits, and DoubleClick
settled.168 The terms of the settlement required DoubleClick to: (1) create
an easy to read privacy policy, which outlines the company’s use of
cookies and pixel tags, and explains its online advertising service; (2)
launch 300 million banner advertisements on sites across the internet that
explain how consumers can protect their privacy, opt out of having a
DoubleClick advertisement server cookie placed on their computers, and
how cookies are used and data is collected; (3) purge user information that
the company collected on consumers on a regular basis; (4) hire an
accounting firm to audit its compliance with the terms; and (5) pay $1.8
million in attorneys’ fees.169
[39] The FTC obtained another large privacy-related settlement from the
data broker ChoicePoint.170 ChoicePoint compiled and sold PII.171 In
2005, the company announced that it sold information to people who
turned out to be identity thieves.172 The FTC charged ChoicePoint with
violating the “Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by furnishing consumer
reports – credit histories – to subscribers who did not have a permissible
purpose to obtain them, and by failing to maintain reasonable procedures
to verify both [subscriber] identities and how [the subscriber’s] intended to
use the information.”173 The FTC reached a settlement with ChoicePoint,
166
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requiring the company to pay $5 million to reimburse consumers for
expenses due to identity theft.174 ChoicePoint also agreed to pay $10
million in civil penalties175 and implement new procedures to ensure that
consumer reports are provided to only “legitimate businesses for lawful
purposes, to establish and maintain a comprehensive information security
program, and to obtain audits by an independent third party security
professional every other year until 2026.”176 Not only must the company
pay for an independent third party review, but if the review is not up to
FTC standards, the FTC could potentially reopen the settlement until
2026.
2. STATE ENFORCEMENT
[40] In addition to the FTC, state attorney generals can bring significant
privacy lawsuits against companies.177 In Hatch v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,178
U.S. Bank sold customer information, including checking account and
credit card numbers, account activity information, marital status, gender,
social security numbers, bankruptcy scores, and other information, to
telemarketing firms for more than $4 million.179 Minnesota’s attorney
general filed suit against U.S. Bank for consumer fraud, false advertising,
deceptive trade practices, and state common law privacy problems in
connection with sales of bank customer’s private information.180 The
bank quickly settled, agreeing to: inform customers of its privacy policy
and provide customers the ability to opt out of sharing information with
affiliated organizations, make refunds to customers who purchased
services and were not happy, and pay a substantial settlement.181
Ultimately, the settlement amount reached $4 million dollars.182
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[41] In New York, attorney general Eliot Spitzer sued Chase Manhattan
Bank (“Chase”) for sharing its cardholders’ personal information with
third party marketers without first disclosing this sharing to its
customers.183 The state reached a settlement with the bank that provided
significant privacy protection for New York customers, exceeding the
protections provided by the GLBA.184 Chase altered privacy policies by
ceasing to share PII with unaffiliated third parties, and only shared names,
addresses, and phone numbers with affiliates.185 Customers could also opt
out of any information sharing.186 In addition to agreeing to refrain from
sharing consumer’s personal financial information, Chase paid attorneys
fees in the amount of $101,500 to the attorney general.187
VII. THE CONSUMER EFFECT
[42] As discussed above, state legislatures are increasing their regulatory
roles in protecting PII, and Congress is likely to follow. The FTC and
state attorney generals are similarly increasing their presence and
consumers are exerting a corresponding pressure that companies are
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beginning to feel.188 As the public becomes more conscious of the
precarious state of consumer privacy interest in their PII, consumer
pressure on businesses will increase proportionately. Soon, businesses
may face the choice of either proactively protecting their consumer’s PII
or losing their customer base.
A. THE IMPETUS FOR CONSUMER ACTION
[43] In 2005, approximately twelve percent of nine thousand consumers
surveyed had received notification regarding a breach of their PII.189 Of
these breaches, eighty-six percent involved the loss or theft of consumer
information, while the remaining fourteen percent involved employee,
student, medical, and taxpayer data.190
[44] In 2006, the cost of fraud was an estimated at $55.7 billion.191
Victims of privacy breach and identify theft “estimate[d] the total value of
all charges on fraudulent accounts in their name” at $87,303 on average.192
Individual consumer estimates ranged from $50 to $500,000 per act, and
the average estimate loss to business creditors due to fraud have increased
seventy-eight percent since 2004.193 Furthermore, resolution of privacy
breaches takes the consumer significant time and funding. While it is
estimated that the consumer spends ninety-seven hours to repair the
damage when an existing account has been used to affect fraud, if a new
account has been created in the victim’s name, resolution of the breach
skyrockets to 231 hours.194 In 2006, the average consumer’s out-of-pocket
costs to resolve breaches for existing or new accounts averaged $1,884
and $1,342 respectively.195 Not surprisingly, “theft or loss of personal and
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financial information is the No. 1 concern of consumers worldwide (64
percent).”196
B. THE COST OF LOST CONSUMER CONFIDENCE
[45] Loss of customer information can have detrimental effects on
businesses, and a reduction in consumer confidence may translate to a
reduction in future revenue.197 Repeated instances of personal information
security breaches will likely have a negative impact on a corporation’s
customer base.198 Specifically, in response to receiving two or more
notifications of a privacy breach, most customers would take their
business elsewhere.199 Further, breaches diminish the potential for
bringing in new customers.200 Given the astonishingly high rate of
security lapses, it is clear that the impact on corporate goodwill and brand
image is a “strategic risk that requires the attention of senior
management.”201
[46] A recent study suggests that loss of goodwill results in quantifiable
financial harm.202 The Ponemon Institute suggests privacy breaches
“translate[] to lost business opportunity.” 203 Lost opportunity is measured
through “customer churn and acquisition costs,” which have risen “from
$98 per record in 2006 to $128 in 2007 – a [thirty percent] increase.”204
The impact of this upward trend cannot be overemphasized. As consumer
awareness increases, the rate of consumer turnover will likely follow.
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[47] In addition to loss of goodwill are the costs associated with
“reputation management and customer support costs including information
hotlines and credit monitoring subscription for victims.”205 Victims of
privacy theft suffer adverse effects on insurance and credit rates, difficulty
in obtaining credit, as well as struggles in seeking employment.206
Clearly, if the consumer is bearing the burden of a company’s
malfeasance, it is unlikely that they will remain a loyal customer. The
adverse effects of customer turnover can cause unforeseeable and lasting
reductions in revenue.207
VIII. THE WRITING ON THE WALL
[48] As the preceding demonstrates, the responsible use of PII translates
into substantial operational benefits and profit potential, while the failure
to maintain and use PII properly creates enormous liabilities. PII directly
affects a company’s bottom line—whether it does so positively or
negatively is largely the result of the manner in which the company
approaches PII security. It is clear, therefore, that the leaders of corporate
America must acknowledge the real value of PII by proactively protecting
against the threats posed to PII and respecting an individual’s privacy
interest in such information.208
[49] The exact manner in which individual companies approach PII will,
of course, depend upon the specific needs and capabilities of each
company.209 One necessary component, however, is increased
involvement from corporate directors and officers.210 Increased board
involvement in protecting customer information has been advocated on
numerous fronts. Federal banking agencies have promulgated guidelines
205
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that require directors to take an active role in protecting consumer
information in the context of GLBA.211 Although these guidelines are
directed to the financial sector, the basic principles are applicable across
many industries. In addition to the banking agencies, courts have
acknowledged the role of directors in information security.212 Similar
direction is emanating in the private sphere from business groups
including the Business Roundtable and the Corporate Governance Task
Force,213 as well as private practice attorneys.214
[50] The writing is on the wall: corporate protection of an individual’s PII
creates revenue growth opportunities and the failure to do so creates
financial liabilities. Whether the directors and executives steering
corporate America heed the growing calls to actively ensure that their
companies protect PII will have a significant impact on not only the future
of U.S. commerce, but also on the privacy of each citizen that takes part in
electronic commerce. This includes the directors and executives
themselves, who are, after all, active participants in commerce. The long
corporate history of appropriate technological protection of financial
assets provides corporations with a roadmap for the comparable treatment
of PII. Hopefully, America’s corporate leaders will read the writing on the
wall and apply the knowledge and experience they have attained
protecting financial assets to the protection of PII before it is too late, for
commerce and for privacy.
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